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Abstract Most formal semantic treatments of countability aim to account for a
binary count/non-count distinction through the use of mereology, or part-structures.
This paper discusses data from Welsh, which possesses three categories of grammati-
cal number, distinguishing a collective/singulative class under which fall entity types
such as COLLECTIVE AGGREGATES (swarming insects, vegetation) and GRANULAR
AGGREGATES (sand). I show that standard mereological accounts turn out not to
be sufficiently expressive to account for this broader typological data. I then argue
that it is necessary to enrich mereology with connection relations that model ways
in which the referents of nouns may come together, resulting in the more expressive
MEREOTOPOLOGY. I show that this extension leads to faithfully modeling the
degrees of countability found in Welsh and overcomes well-known problems for
classical mereological accounts, e.g., the “minimal parts” problem.
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1 Introduction
The traditional semantic analysis of the mass/count distinction, stemming from
Quine (1960) and Link (1983), models a binary countable/non-countable contrast
within a mereological framework (or other equivalent part-structures) via several
semantic properties, such as ATOMICITY, CUMULATIVITY and DIVISIVENESS. This
approach has been rightly influential: it is able to model a variety of different types
of entities (singular, plural, mass) which is elusive in standard set theory, and is
further able to derive the grammatical behavior of nouns as either countable or
non-countable through whether the nominal predicate satisfies different properties,
e.g., atomicity for countable nouns or divisiveness for non-countable nouns. Despite
these gains, using classical extensional mereology to model countability phenomena
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is beset by several persistent problems. For instance, it has been widely noted that
the semantic properties made available by mereology fail to fully predict which
nouns are countable and which are non-countable (see Taylor 1977; Zucchi & White
2001, among others).
This paper retains the spirit of the traditional semantic approach grounding
countability distinctions in semantic distinctions, yet argues that (i) countability is a
richer phenonmenon than a binary countable/non-countable contrast, and, in part be-
cause of this but also because of theory-internal difficulties with mereology, that (ii)
a richer variant of the mereological framework extended with topological relations is
necessary. First, in section 2, I argue that modeling a binary countable/non-countable
distinction is not sufficient as an emprical target. Although English presents a binary
contrast, other languages may make a richer set of countability distinctions, as is
shown for Welsh, and thus there are actually degrees of countability that must be
modeled. In section 3, I argue that the failure of mereology to adequately model
countability distinctions stems from foundational inadequacies of mereology, which
have attracted much discussion in the philosophy and ontological modeling litera-
tures. Standard mereology is not capable of modeling what it means to be a whole
individual, nor capture relations between individuals, both of which are necessary
for modeling countability. Section 3 proposes a topological extension of the mere-
ological framework that is able to properly model different entity types such as
substances, whole individuals, and varieties of collectives. In section 4, I apply this
system to the grammatical number systems of English and Welsh.
2 Countability and the collective-unit distinction in Welsh
Welsh, like English, displays a contrast between countable and non-countable nouns.
Countable nouns show a regular alternation between singular and plural values while
non-countable nouns are “not usually found in the plural” (King 2003: 35). Examples
of countable and non-countable nouns are given in (1a) and (1b), respectively. This
contrast is also supported by co-occurrence behavior with quantifiers such as amryw
‘several’, which co-occurs with countable plural nouns, but not with non-countable
nouns, as shown in (2) (Jones & Thomas 1977: 176).
(1) a. Countable (plural-coded) nouns: afal/afalau ‘apple/apples’; cadair/
cadairiau ‘chair/chairs’; dyn/dynion ‘man/men’; merch/merched ‘girl/girls’
b. Non-countable nouns: glo ‘coal’; ’menyn ‘butter’; llefrith ‘milk’
(2) amryw o ’r llyfrau/*eira
‘several of the books/*snow’
Yet, Welsh, unlike English, possesses two distinct types of countable nouns.
In addition to nouns where the plural value is morphologically coded, as in (1a),
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Countability Category Singular Plural Gloss
Singular/Plural cadair cadairiau ‘chair’
Collective/Unit cacyn-en cacwn ‘hornet’
Non-Count llefrith ‘milk’
Table 1 The Tripartite Grammatical Number System of Welsh
there is a second type of noun where the singular value is morphologically coded.
I will follow the terminology of King (2003) and designate the latter type as the
COLLECTIVE/UNIT class and call the morpheme which codes the singular value the
SINGULATIVE. Typical examples of nouns in this class are given in (3). A notional
distinction accompanies this formal distinction: nouns in the collective/unit class
are entities which habitually co-occur in the world. Stolz (2001) provides a detailed
analysis of the lexical items which comprise the collective/unit class in Welsh,
noting that they are restricted to a small number of entity types, namely what I call
COLLECTIVE AGGREGATES, such as small animals, insects, vegetation or cereals,
and what I call GRANULAR AGGREGATES, such as sand. Stolz concludes that nouns
in this class designate entities which are “saliently perceived as collectivities rather
than ‘individuals”’ (2001: 65). Table 1 summarizes the three different categories in
Welsh’s number system: singular/plural, collective/unit, and non-countable.
(3) Collective/Unit nouns: cacwn/cacyn-en ‘hornets/hornet’; picwn/picwn-en
‘bees/bee’, chwain/chwann-en ‘flea/fleas’; dincod/dincod-yn ‘seeds/a seed’;
ceirch/ceirch-en ‘oats/an oat’; chwynn/chwynn-yn ‘weeds/weed’; cnau/cneu-
en ‘nuts/nut’; tywod/tywod-yn ‘sand/grain of sand’; marwor/marwor-yn
‘embers/an ember’; llwch/llych-yn ‘dust/speck of dust’
The first question to be addressed is whether this additional category of collec-
tives is actually relevant for understanding the distinction between countable and
non-countable nouns. Coming from the perspective of a binary count/non-count
contrast, one could question whether these three categories could not be wedged into
a binary mold. Two arguments indicate that such a reduction is unwanted.
First, the entity types in the collective/unit class are notionally distinct from
those typically associated with countable and non-countable nouns. The core classes
of entity types realized as non-countable nouns and countable nouns in Welsh and
English are essentially identical, namely liquids/substances and individuated objects,
respectively. Yet, the collective class does not fit comfortably in either. Many
members of the collective class would make for extremely dubious individuals, for
instance in the case of the cognates of dust or sand, a point reinforced by the fact
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that these nouns are non-countable in English.
A more serious objection to conflating the collective class with simple plural
nouns is that it is common for collective nouns to make a three-way distinction
between collective, singular and plural values, which would be unexpected if the
collective and plural values coincided. An example from Welsh is given in (4) (from
Stolz 2001: 70) where the collective and plural forms clearly designate distinct
meanings: the pluralized singulative form designates a set of individual pieces in
contrast to, e.g., a heap of grain.
(4) grawn / gron-yn / gron-ynn-au
grain / grain-SING / grain-SG-PL
‘grain / a single grain / grains’
Another possibility is that collectives could be treated as related to “group”
nouns (in the sense of Landman 1989); however, there are two arguments against
collapsing the collective class with group nouns. Again, the collective class differs
notionally from characteristic group nouns, such as committee, which designate
social bodies or organizations. Further, group nouns in Welsh are a grammatically
distinct class of nouns: the singular value is morphologically uncoded while the
plural value is moprhologically coded, similar to standard countable nouns, but the
singular noun form requires plural agreement with the verb.
The implication for theories of countability, then, is that a binary categorization of
nouns into countable and non-countable may be necessary, but is not sufficient. Both
a simple grammatical distinction between nouns compatible with number coding and
those not, as well as a notional distinction between individuals and non-individuals,
oversimplifies the typological space. Semantic theories of countability must also
account for collective entities, modeling how they habitually come together.
3 A mereotopological treatment of countability
A central advantage of using mereology for linguistic applications is its liberal view
of what an individual designates. A mereological “individual” may correspond to any
number of entities in the world which are disjoint and even widely spatially separated.
Nor does an individual necessarily have any boundaries—from the viewpoint of
mereology, “an individual is simply a segment of the world of experience, and
its boundaries may be complex to any degree” (Goodman 1951: 42). Thus, an
individual can be any section of the world, or combinations thereof. This flexibility
as to what qualifies as an individual is the source of its usefulness for the treatment of
countability, since it is able to model plural and substance “individuals”. Yet, while
mereology may represent plural and substance entities where set theory cannot,
much recent work in philosophy and ontological modeling (Smith 1996, Casati &
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Varzi 1999) has pointed out significant gaps between intuitions about how objects
stand in the world and what mereology delivers: the concept of a whole object
or relations holding between individuals are inexpressible in classical mereology.
These works propose to remedy the situation by extending standard mereology with
connectedness relations, constructing systems of “mereotopology”.
This section lays out the classic mereological treatment of countability and
discusses its shortcomings. I will argue that many of these shortcomings are related
to the general shortcomings of mereology. I then pursue a topological extension of
mereology that will account for (i) the core data of objects and substances which has
proved problematic to model over the last decades and (ii) the richer data concerning
collectives elaborated in section 2.
Before proceeding, it is worth warding off terminological confusion concerning
the use of individual. Its use in the mereological literature is clearly different from
the pre-theoretic sense, where it refers to well-defined physical objects in opposition
to stuff. To eliminate any confusion, I will refer to individuals in the mereological
sense as M-INDIVIDUALS and retain INDIVIDUAL for the pre-theoretic use.
3.1 Mereology and countability: The classic account and its shortcomings
I first lay out a standard axiomatization of mereology which has been assumed in
canonical works on countability in the formal semantic tradition, such as Link 1983,
Krifka 1989, and Landman 1989, before proceeding to enrich it. The lexical core of
a mereological theory is provided by a treatment of the “part-of” relationship, ≤.
There is wide consensus that to conform to its intuitive use, the part relation must be
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive, given as the first three axioms.1 The relations
OVERLAP and PROPER PART can then be defined as in D 1–D 2.
M 1 x ≤ x (Reflexivity)
M 2 x≤ y∧ y≤ x→ x = y (Antisymmetry)
M 3 x≤ y∧ y≤ z→ x≤ z (Transitivity)
D 1 O(x,y) = de f ∃z(z≤ x∧ z≤ y) (Overlap)
D 2 x < y = de f x≤ y∧¬(y≤ x) (Proper Part)
The basic axioms of mereology are extended in two ways. The first type of
extension restricts the manner in which an m-individual can be decomposed into
different parts through the SUPPLEMENTATION axiom (also known as the REMAIN-
DER PRINCIPLE). This requires that if an object a has a proper part b, then there is
also another proper part, c, which doesn’t overlap with b. This excludes in particular
1 All the axioms given here are universally quantified.
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models where an m-individual is decomposed into a single proper part. The second
type of extension concerns adding individuals together. The sum operation is defined
in D 3 and notation for a binary sum operator and a generalized sum operator is
given in D 4 and D 5, respectively. The traditional principle of mereology, again not
uncontroversial as will be discussed further in section 3.2, is that for any two individ-
uals, there is also a sum individual comprised of those two individuals. Another way
to state this is that the part structures that are of interest are those which are closed
under sum formation, which is ensured by requiring every set of m-individuals to
have a unique sum, for which the axiom is given in M 5.
M 4 x < y→∃z(z≤ y∧¬O(z,x)) (Supplementation)
D 3 sum(x,X) = de f ∀y[X(y)→ y≤ x]∧∀z[z≤ x→∃z′[X(z′)∧O(z,z′)]]
(A sum of a set X is a thing that contains everything in X and whose parts each
overlap with something in X.)
D 4 x⊕ y = de f ιz sum(z,{x,y})
D 5
⊕
X = de f ιz sum(z,X) where X is any set
M 5 ∀X [X 6= /0→∃!zsum(z,X)] (Uniqueness of Sums)
The theory arrived at through these different axioms is the standard version
of mereology used in philosophy and semantic theory, known in the literature as
GENERAL EXTENSIONAL MEREOLOGY. This system is expressive enough to
represent the standard Boolean operators, such as DIFFERENCE and COMPLEMENT,
given in D 6 and D 7, respectively.
D 6 x− y = de f ιz∀w(w≤ z↔ (w≤ x∧¬O(w,y))) (Difference)
D 7 −x = de f ιz∀w(w≤ z↔¬O(w,x)) (Complement)
In addition to being tolerant of different types of entities (plurals, substances),
mereology provides a natural framework in which to elegantly model properties
of entities through their behavior in terms of the part relation. Properties such as
CUMULATIVITY, DIVISIVENESS, or ATOMICITY have been argued to characterize
the countability status of different predicates. The relation between these properties
and the classification of nouns as countable or non-countable is controversial for
each property. For instance, since Quine (1960), cumulativity and divisiveness, given
in D 8 and D 9, have been typically considered as relevant for non-countable nouns.
Yet, cumulativity characterizes not only non-countable predicates such as water, but
also plural predicates, such as cows. Consequently, cumulativity does not distinguish
countable from non-countable nouns and so it is unclear if this property by itself has
much to do with countability per se.
D 8 Cumulative(P) = ∀x∀y[P(x)∧P(y)→ P(x⊕ y)]
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D 9 Divisive(P) = ∀x[P(x)→∀y[y < x→ P(y)]]
It is initially plausible that divisiveness characterizes non-countability. For
instance, assuming that mud is a divisive predicate, for a given quantity of mud, it
follows that every part of this mud is again mud, whereby it is clear why such a
predicate is non-countable: it does not provide a stable unit for counting. An entity
that could be described as one mud could by the same rights be described as any
arbitrary number of muds, since all its parts are mud as well. Yet, as is well-known,
grounding non-countability in the property of divisiveness produces many counter-
examples when applied systematically across the lexicon. One effective illustration
comes from non-countable nouns such as soup (Taylor 1977). If soup is divisive
and soup is true of some a, then any part of a, say a, is also soup. Yet, should a
carrot be in the soup, the part of the soup which consists of some interior chunk of
the carrot, does not count as an instance of soup.
The third property, ATOMICITY, is often intended to characterize discrete in-
dividuals. From a mereological point of view, an atom is an individual which has
no proper parts, as given in D 10. Some approaches simply have models that are
atomistic (Link 1983; Chierchia 1998a). This is implemented by adding an axiom
requiring everything to be ultimately composed of atoms, as in M 6. A different
approach defines atoms relative to a property, as given in D 11. Given this definition,
one can further define what it means for a predicate to be atomic, as in D 12 from
Krifka (1989), where AtomicP indicates atomic relative to P.
D 10 Atom(x)↔¬∃y(y < x) (Atom)
M 6 ∀x∃y(y≤ x∧¬∃z(z < y)) (Atomicity)
D 11 Atomic(x,P) = P(x)∧¬∃y[y < x∧P(y)] (Atomic relative to a property)
D 12 Atomic(P) = ∀x[P(x)→∃y[y≤ x∧Atomic(y,P)]] (Atomic predicate)
While most countable nouns can be reasonably treated as atomic predicates,
there are still several classes of problematic nouns, discussed at length in Zucchi &
White 2001 and Rothstein 2010. One such class of nouns is exemplified by fence,
where a part of a fence may again merit being designated as a fence. Geometrical
terms such as line or grouping terms such as sequence show the same behavior.
Terms of indefinite reference, such as event, thing, a quantity of X also fail to be
atomic.
In summary, the wide adoption of these properties is an indication of their
intuitive appeal and it is also clear that these are sensible properties to propose
from the mereological perspective, as they all exploit the part relation in a natural
way. Yet, decades of research have shown that the correspondence between these
properties and countability phenomena is imperfect.
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In addition to the well-known problems just discussed, there are problems with
the foundations of mereology itself. These are not discussed in the literature on
countability, but the philosophical and ontological modeling literature has argued
that mereology’s use of mereological individuals simply does not provide a satisfying
account of ordinary individual objects, which is of course one of mereology’s aims as
a model of the world. While mereology is often said to be a theory of the part-whole
relation, in truth it is only a theory of parthood and does not give a sufficient account
of whole objects.2 The sum of two entities a⊕b is often casually equated with the
“whole” to which the parts a and b belong. Yet, sums simply cannot be equated with
wholes—the sum of the Empire State Building and the letter ‘z’ exists by the same
rights as the sum of two halves of an apple making a whole apple. As Casati & Varzi
(1999: 51) state, “it is impossible . . . to draw a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’
wholes.” These criticisms of mereology’s expressive power are in turn relevant for
an adequate treatment of the countability distinctions of different nominal predicates.
At its most intuitive, the distinction between countable and non-countable nouns
is tied to the distinction between objects and substances. This distinction is obviously
too coarse for, e.g., non-countable nouns in English, but at least this must be covered.
Objects, in turn, are intuitively whole objects, as Soja, Carey & Spelke (1991) and
Prasada, Ferenz & Haskell (2002) have shown in the developmental and cognitive
literatures. If the criticism that mereology doesn’t provide a satisfactory treatment
of whole objects is well-placed, then it is clear from where (at least some of) the
problems that arose in modeling countability stem: mereology is not suited to
represent (at least) one side of object/substance divide.
It also becomes clear then why higher order properties such as atomic or quan-
tized fail as characterizations of objects: they are an attempt to characterize wholes
in a theory which is unable to carry out that task. Yet, since the part relation does
not say anything about what a whole object is, these properties, based on the part
relation, do not provide a characterization of what a whole is either. Instead, these
properties demonstrate the awkward fit between the explananda and the character-
ization in terms of parts. Atomicity/quantization leads to finding parts when one
doesn’t want them, as in the case of fence. On the other hand, divisiveness leads to
not finding parts where one needs them, e.g., according to divisiveness, one should
(but doesn’t) find increasing smaller parts of soup which count as soup.
2 This is one of the criticisms put forth by Moltmann (1997) in relation to the countable/non-countable
distinction, an important precedent for the view I argue for. Moltmann also proposes that whole
objects must be formally recognized, although her account rejects mereology altogether. See Pianesi
2002 for a critical view on Moltmann’s rejection of mereology.
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3.2 Extending mereology: Part-whole structures and connectedness
I will now extend mereology with topological relations, following in many respects
the discussion of strengthening mereology with topology found in Casati & Varzi
1999. The fundamental change is adding the relationship of CONNECTEDNESS,
which then interacts with the different definitions and axioms of standard mereology.
The intuitive definition of being connected is that two entities are connected if they
share a common boundary. An alternate characterization is that if two entities are
disjoint, then they are SEPARATED. Accordingly, any entities that are not separated
are connected. It is easy to illustrate with some examples from the physical world.
My chair is touching the floor, and therefore qualifies as connected to the floor.
The upper two-thirds of my mug is connected to the lower two-thirds; in fact they
overlap, sharing a common part in the middle third. My mug and the Taj Mahal are,
however, separated (although they do have a mereological sum).
Some basic requirements are that the relation C, CONNECTED, is reflexive and
symmetrical. These are added as axioms in T 1 and T 2. There are some further
intuitive interactions with the mereological relations part, ≤, and overlap, O, that
Casati & Varzi (1999) note. First, the axiom in T 3 ensures that parthood implies
connectedness. From T 3 the relation in (5) follows, whereby overlap implies
connectedness.
T 1 C(x,x) (Reflexivity)
T 2 C(x,y)→ C(y,x) (Symmetry)
T 3 x≤ y→∀z(C(x,z)→C(z,y))
(5) O(x,y)→C(x,y)
This extension of mereology is able to express standard notions of topology, such
as interior, closure or boundary, and a wide array of mereotopological properties
that make fine-grained distinctions as to different configurations that objects may
be in. I show now how it can be exploited to model whole objects and different
connectedness relations holding between entites, substances and aggregates.
3.3 Defining wholes
Returning to one of the primary motivations for adding topological relations, it
is now possible to distinguish entities which form one whole piece as opposed
to arbitrary sums. This is achieved through recognizing “self-connected” (SC)
entities—individuals which cannot be divided into two separated parts. The basic
definition is given in D 13.
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D 13 SC(x) = de f ∀y,z(∀w(O(w,x)↔ (O(w,y)∨O(w,z)))→C(y,z))
(An entity x is self-connected if any two parts that make up the whole of x are
connected to each other.)
We can now distinguish between objects which come in one piece as opposed
to scattered objects. For instance, suppose our domain of discourse contains four
individuals, where a and b are two halves of a sphere and c and d are my left shoe
and the Eiffel Tower. Then we can distinguish the sum x = a⊕ b from the sum
y = c⊕d. x is a whole, i.e., SC(x) is true, while the “scattered individual” y is not a
whole, and SC(y) is false.
Yet, this definition does not rule out a sum of entities which just “touch”—a
stronger notion is needed to do justice to the notion of a whole. Casati & Varzi
(1999) supply two stronger self-connectedness properties, which rely on the ability
of mereotopology to discuss the interior of an object. First, I give the definition of
the property of INTERNAL PART (IP) in D 14. The defintion of interior is given in
D 15 as the sum of an m-individual’s internal parts. Now, a stronger requirement
on self-connectedness can be stated wherein an entity’s interior must be connected,
given in D 16, which correctly rules out entities which just touch on their borders.
D 14 IP(x,y) = de f x≤ y∧∀z(C(z,x)→ O(z,y)) (Internal Part)
D 15 ix = de f
⊕
X where X = {y : IP(y,x) = True} (interior)
D 16 SSC(x) = de f SC(x)∧SC(ix) (Strongly Self-Connected)
If an individual has the property of being strongly self-connected, that still
does not guarantee that it is also a whole in the intuitive sense. Consider the m-
individual, i.e., “the segment of the world of experience” according to Goodman,
that corresponds to exactly one half of a sphere. The half sphere qualifies as strongly
self-connected, but it does not intuitively qualify as a whole, for that would be
the entire sphere. Since we are interested in unity, we can define being maximally
connected relative to a property, which provides our final definition of what it means
to be a whole. If an entity satisfies Maximally Strongly Self-Connected (MSSC)
as given in D 17, then that entity is the largest entity satisfying that property which
is self-connected. Although such distinctions may seem subtle, they have very
welcome consequences for modeling countability.
D 17 MSSC(x,P) = de f P(x)∧SSC(x)∧∀y(P(y)∧SSC(y)∧O(y,x)↔ y≤ x)
(Maximally Strongly Self-Connected relative to a Property)
(An m-individual is Maximally Strongly Self-Connected relative to a property if (i)
every (interior) part of the individual is connected to (overlaps) the whole (Strongly
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Self-Connected) and (ii) anything else which has the same property and overlaps it
is once again part of it (Maximality).)
I can now treat predicates which refer to individuals (in the pre-theoretical, non-
mereological sense) as those predicates which are restricted to designating whole
objects or sums thereof. Very little must change about the way that we represent
the meaning of count nouns, except for the substitution of the property of being a
whole object, viz. MSSC, for the property atomicity. For instance, the condition
given in (6) of an INDIVIDUAL-predicate is an adaptation of the definition of an
atomic predicate in D 12. This condition prevents strongly connected (overlapping)
individuals from being in the extension of an individual predicate. The singular
property of, for instance, dog, simply picks out individual (whole) dogs.
(6) INDIVIDUAL(P)→∀x[P(x)→∃y[y≤ x∧MSSC(y,P)]]
(A predicate is INDIVIDUAL if any m-individual that satisfies the predicate
has a (not necessarily proper) part which is a MSSC m-individual.)
Using the full strength of maximally strongly self-connected (MSSC) m-individuals
overcomes the problems for atomicity related to predicates such as fence or twig,
discussed in section 3.1. As a result of the maximality condition, the problems
with predicates such as fence simply do not arise: INDIVIDUAL-predicates restrict
their reference to pick out only MSSC m-individuals, which by definition will be
in each case the largest individual satisfying, for instance, fence. A part of a fence
may have all the requisite features to satisfy the predicate fence, but it will not be a
MSSC-individual. Thus, when a fence is uttered, this will pick out only the whole
object, although there are a variety of ways to pick out portions of the fence, which,
if considered in isolation, would also qualify as an instance of the kind fence. This
explanation extends to other examples problematic for atomicity, such as twig and
line or even the more fanciful example of the Pope’s crown (Wiggins 1980: 73),
which is problematic since it contains three smaller crowns. When using MSSC as
the foundational property of countable nouns, these problems simply don’t arise.
3.4 Varieties of connectedness
The basic connectedness relation C is taken as primitive, from which different
degrees of connectedness can be defined. The two primary types of connectedness
turn upon whether the two connected entities overlap in a substantive sense or only
tangentially. STRONGLY CONNECTED is defined between two individuals when
they overlap substantively. This can be succinctly defined in the full theory of
mereotopology as in D 18. Recalling the notion of strong self-connectedness (SSC),
a relation of strong connection can be defined between two m-individuals if their
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sum is strongly self-connected. Note that defining strongly connected in terms
of simple overlap leaves something to be desired, as that would include cases of
tangential overlap as being considered strongly connected. Here the interiors of the
two individuals are constrained to be overlapping, a stronger condition. In contrast to
Strongly Connected, one can define the relation that holds between individuals which
are only tangentially connected, or EXTERNALLY CONNECTED (EXTC), where two
m-individuals are connected, but their interiors do not overlap, as given in D 19.3
D 18 StrongC(x,y) = de f ∃w∃z(w≤ x∧ z≤ y∧SSC(w⊕ z))
D 19 ExtC(x,y) = C(x,y)∧¬C(ix, iy)
To these variations, I add, in a slight abuse of terminology, a notion of PROXI-
MATELY CONNECTED (PROXC), where two entities are not contiguous, but “suf-
ficiently near”. (To foreshadow, this is an appropriate connectedness relation to
describe, for instance, swarming insects.) To establish this relation, a definition of
distance must be given. I assume a standard distance function d, which given two
entities, returns the distance between them. A relation which holds of entities which
are ‘proximate’ to one another can be defined as in D 20. Of course, the aim is
not to characterize nearness in any absolute sense, but relative to the entities under
discussion. I assume that the relevant value of n will be determined with respect to
the predicate.
D 20 ProxC(x,y) = de f d(x,y)≤ n
This concludes the addition of different varieties of connectedness that will be useful
for characterizing different entity types with respect to their relation to different
countability classes.
3.5 Substances
I now turn to the designation of substance terms such as water or iron. Part of the
intuition behind the property of divisiveness, as well as Schwarzschild’s (2011) or
Chierchia’s (1998b) analysis of non-countable nouns, is that pure substances such
as oil, water or wood have the trait that when one refers to an m-individual, then
simultaneously one refers to multiple instances. Yet, as reviewed in section 3.1,
modeling this intuition using the property of divisiveness leads to the unwelcome
consequence of the “minimal parts problem”. The other route, collapsing substance
3 An equivalent to the external connection relation is used by Krifka (1998) to define “adjacency
structures” which are used to model paths.
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terms with plural entities, captures this intuition but violates other intuitions, e.g.,
that substances are simply different from a collection of entities.
Within the framework developed here, the intuition that substances involve
multiplicity in a certain sense can be satisfied, yet something still stronger can be
said. Substances manifest the property that a given instance of, say, water, will
overlap with other instances of water. In terms of the framework just developed,
instances of a substance come strongly connected with other instances. In this sense,
the presence of an instance of water implies the presence of another instance of
water. Recalling that the converse of connected is separated, another way to fix the
intuitions for this property is that no instance of a liquid/substance is separated from
all the other instances of that liquid/substance. The relevant property is that each
occurrence of water is locally strongly connected.4
The condition given in (7) states that substance predicates require their extension
to be comprised of m-individuals which are strongly connected to other m-individuals
of the same substance. This will be satisfied, for instance, by a section of a pool of
water—it overlaps with other sections of the pool of water, which are again water.
Also, since connectedness is implied by parthood, the whole pool of water is strongly
connected to its parts which are water.
(7) SUBSTANCE(P)→∀x[P(x)→∃x′[P(x′)∧ x′ 6= x∧StrongC(x,x′)]]
(If P is a substance predicate then all m-individuals that satisfy P are strongly
connected to a distinct m-individual of the same substance.)
This condition will also be satisfied when taking the sum of two portions of
water, say two pools—here supposing that an instance of water was the sum of two
portions of water a⊕b. Then our condition tells us that there are additional strongly
connected m-indiviudals for each element of the sum-individual.
This condition on the semantics of substances has several advantages over the
properties used in previous approaches. First, unlike cumulativity, the condition in (7)
distinguishes substance predicates from nouns with plural denotations. Plural nouns
such as boys do not satisfy the condition of having their referents being (locally)
strongly connected. Second, the difficulties facing divisiveness are avoided under
this account. The difficulty was that many substance nouns do not lend themselves
to being infinitely divisible into the same type of stuff. Soup, for instance, may
contain meatballs that, while part of the soup, are not in themselves soup, contrary
to what divisiveness predicts. The characterization of substance terms given in (7),
however, accords with this scenario: any individual portion of a soup which in itself
4 ‘Locally’ connected indicates that not every instance of water is connected, since clearly water may
appear parceled out into puddles, rivers, glasses and so on; but locally, an instance of water is always
connected to another instance of water, where the second instance may contain or be contained in the
first.
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qualifies as soup will be strongly connected to another such individual. Yet, there is
no commitment to infinite part-taking, the problematic aspect of divisiveness.
A final remark concerns the observation that there is no (natural) individuating
standard for substance entities (Cartwright 1975; Quine 1960). It turns out that in
the system developed here establishing a “minimal instance” for a substance term
leads to contradiction, which is a welcome result. I take a minimal instance to be
one which (i) does not contain another entity of the same sort (which is the atomicity
property) and (ii) is able to be isolated from other instances of the entity (which
is the property of being separated from other instances, in other words not being
connected to other instances). A predicate such as boy will clearly satisfy having
a minimal instance. Yet, an entity falling under a substance predicate, assuming
that it obeys the condition given in (7), cannot satisfy these conditions. Suppose
there was a minimal instance of water, water. In order to satisfy (7), this instance
must be strongly connected to another instance of water, water. Assuming that
water is strongly connected to water by containing it violates the first condition of
being a minimal instance, whereas assuming that they are connected in any other
manner (viz. overlap) violates the second. Thus, assuming that a substance term
has a minimal instance leads to a contradiction. In sum, treating substance terms as
designating entities which must be strongly connected to like entities avoids some of
the classic problems facing divisiveness, yet still represents the core intuitions that
one would want the semantic theory to represent.
3.6 Aggregates
Aggregates, such as sand or rice, are a hybrid, possessing at once minimal parts while
also designating groups which come together in some manner. The mereotopological
framework provides sufficient means to represent aggregates as a category of entities
that differ from individuals or sums. I will discuss the two most prominent types of
aggregates, what I have termed granular and collective aggregates. The core idea that
I will pursue is that while aggregate terms designate minimal parts, and accordingly
will designate sums of these minimal parts, the different connection relations can
be exploited to designate “connected clusters” of the entities in question, ultimately
capturing that, for instance, sand occurs as individual grains, as sums thereof, as
well as in clusters.
To treat aggregates, two auxiliary notions must be defined. First, I give the
relation TRANSITIVELY CONNECTED (TransitiveC) relative to a property in D 21.
This relation allows us to state whether two entities are connected through a series
of like entities. For instance, two grains of sand on opposite sides of a pile of sand
are not externally connected to one another, but they are transitively (externally)
connected through a series of grains of sand within the pile.
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D 21 TransitiveC(x,y,P,C,Z) =de f ∀z∈Z[P(z)∧(x= z∧y= zn)∧Czz∧Czz . . . ∧
Czn−zn] where Z = {z,z, . . . ,zn} (Transitively Connected)
(x and y are transitively connected relative to a property P, a connection relation C,
and a set of entities Z, when all members of Z satisfy P and x and y are connected
through the sequence of zis in Z.)
With the definition of transitive connection in hand, the notion of a connected cluster
can be given in D 22. This definition provides a way to refer to collections of
m-individuals that are related by a particular connection relation, such as a pile of
sand or a swarm of locusts. At the same time, this does not enforce taking maximal
clusters—a desirable property as, for instance, a pile of sand, which is a clustered
individual, includes many other clustered individuals.
D 22 Cluster(x,P,C) =de f ∃Z[x =
⊕
Z ∧ ∀z,z′ ∈ Z ∃Y [TransitiveC(z,z′,P,C,Y )]]
(Clustered Individual)
(x is a cluster relative to a property P and a connection relation C iff x is a sum of
entities falling under the same property which are all transitively connected relative
to some set Y under the same property and connection relation.)
A general condition on aggregates is given in (8) below, which states that the
denotational space of aggregate nouns includes MSSC individuals, clusters and sums.
In (8), I use the notation C as a variable over connectedness relations, e.g., External
Connectedness and Proximately Connected, and use CLUSTERC to represent
the set of clustered individuals under the relevant connection relation C, SUM to
represent the set of sum individuals and MSSC for the set of MSSC individuals.
(8) AGG(P,C)→∀x[P(x)→ x ∈ CLUSTERC ∪SUM∪MSSC]
(If P is an aggregate predicate relative to a connection relation then all
m-individuals that satisfy P have cluster, MSSC or sum reference.)
The type of connection relation has been underspecified in the definition, but
instantiating it with different connection types results in the different aggregate
types discussed. A clustered individual under the External Connectedness relation
designates a cluster of individuals which are connected by touching, which is an
appropriate designation for a canonical instance of sand or rice. A clustered indi-
vidual under the Proximately Connected relation specifies a group of individuals all
within a particular distance of one another, for instance, berries which are all within
one inch of each other. This serves as a representation of collective aggregates such
as insects or berries, which do not appear in groups where each individual touches
another, but where they are all at some distance from one another.
This definition is very permissive, but is useful as a general definition of ag-
gregates. Sand, for example, will be true of single grains (MSSC individuals) or
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sums thereof, as well as clusters of sand (e.g., piles), which are clusters of externally
connected individuals, or a combination of these types.
This section has developed the formal machinery to treat different entities types.
I now turn to using the various formal distinctions in accounting for the grammatical
number systems of English and Welsh.
4 Number morphology
Against the backdrop of the richer framework developed, the actual account of
the semantics of number morphology is, as one would hope, rather simple. Three
different types of elements are in play. First, nouns which allow number distinctions
may vary in different languages as to what is designated by the basic form of a
noun, e.g., that which is not morphologically marked by a number morpheme. For
instance, an unmarked countable noun in English refers to single entities, while
an unmarked noun in Welsh may refer to clustered individuals. As for the number
morphemes, they vary both in (i) the nature of the operation, viz. pluralization or
unitization, and (ii) the presuppositions in effect about the domains over which they
operate. I first discuss the more familiar case of English and then proceed to Welsh.
4.1 English
The core result that one would like from a compositional account of the number
morphology of English is an adequate treatment of where number morphology,
viz. pluralization via -s, is permitted to occur and where it is not. For one part of this
problem, namely treating countable nouns, I am able to follow traditional accounts of
plurality with only minor modifications. The additional distinctions made in section
3 come into play for accounting for where plurality is disallowed: both nouns such
as water and sand violate the prerequisites of plurality, but in different fashions.
Countable nouns in English, for which I will consider dog to be the parade
example, do not require any radically different account from those used in the past,
and I am able to maintain the standard view, with the exception that the property
used is of course no longer atomicity but being a MSSC individual. Thus, we can
state with, for instance, Link (1983) that the denotation of the singular form of dog
is the property satisfied by singular entities, as given in (9), although MSSC is now
the relevant property determining what a singular entity is.
(9) JdogK := λxO[R(xO,Dog)∧MSSC(xO)]
The plural morpheme -s can be treated as an operator, which presupposes a set of,
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in our case, MSSC individuals and then returns the set of sums.5 The presupposition
associated with the operation is expressed following a period after the lambda
expression, as in “λP.Presupposition[−−−]”. I also make use of the ∗ operator
from Link (1983), which given a set, returns the sums of things in that set. This
analysis of -s is given in (10), which parallels Link’s analysis of the plural.
(10) J-sK := λPλx.PMSSC[P∗(x)−MSSC(x)] = λP.PMSSC[P∗(x)∧ x ∈ SUM]
Given this treatment of the plural, its incompatibility with substance predicates
such as water is immediate: the plural morpheme requires MSSC individuals, which
are not provided by substance predicates.6 Similarly, granular aggregate nouns
in English such as sand, rice or gravel, like substance terms, designate the entire
semilattice, as in (11). Again, pluralization fails, since there is not a set of MSSC
individuals from which sum individuals can be formed, rather the denotation of the
noun includes much more.
(11) JsandK := λxO[R(xO,Sand)∧ xO ∈ CLUSTEREC∪SUM∪MSSC]
I now turn to Welsh, which exploits the denotational space of these nouns in a
different way.
4.2 Welsh
The countability categories of nouns in Welsh can be treated in an analogous manner
to the analysis of English, despite the fact that the inventory differs. The class
of singular/plural nouns in Welsh admits of the exact same treatment as given for
English nouns with a singular/plural distinction. The denotation of an individual
predicate such as cadiar ‘chair’ and the plural morpheme -ou/-au parallel the entries
for their English counterparts and are given in (12) and (13), respectively. Similarly,
nothing special needs to be said about substance terms in Welsh—they behave in the
same manner as substance terms in English do.
(12) JcadairK := λxO[R(xO,Chair)∧ xO ∈MSSC]
(13) J-ou/-auK := λPλx.PMSSC[P∗(x)−MSSC(x)] = λPλx.PMSSC[P∗(x)∧ x ∈
SUM]
5 I am here assuming the classical “exclusive” analysis of the plural, where singular entities are not
included. Nothing crucial hinges on this for the points being made here about English or Welsh.
6 There may be polysemy through which a second representation for, e.g., water, is available that
presupposes a set of MSSC individuals, such as servings of water. But the availability of this meaning
is here taken to be a fact about lexicalization or, in some cases, coercion of noun meaning.
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The collective/unit class is the interesting case, but it too can be treated in a
manner similar to the analysis of English. First, in the same way that unmarked
count nouns in English are restricted to being interpreted as singular, collective/unit
nouns in Welsh are in their basic form restricted to clustered individuals. The lexical
entry for cacwn ‘hornet’ is given in (14), stating that cacwn designates entities
which satisfy the property hornet and are clustered individuals by virtue of being
proximately connected. The denotational space of the lexical entry does not include
arbitrary sums. This is consistent with the discussion of Welsh in section 2, where it
was noted that these nouns had a strong sense of designating a collection rather than
an arbitrary set of individuals. Additionally, if arbitrary sums were included, it would
be expected that these nouns could be directly modified by cardinal numbers—but
these nouns only take cardinal modification once the singulative has been applied.
(14) JcacwnK := λxO[R(xO,Hornet)∧ xO ∈ CLUSTERPC]
The singulative marker can then be treated as an operator as in (15). In parallel to
the restriction on the plural morpheme which presupposes MSSC individuals, the
singulative morpheme presupposes a set of clustered individuals. Given such a set
of clustered individuals, it returns the parts which are MSSC, i.e., the units. Since
the singulative presupposes clustered individuals, its application to count nouns such
as cadiar ‘chair’ is correctly ruled out. Similarly, the application of the singulative
would also be ruled out for substance nouns—although substance nouns possess
clustered individuals, they do not possess MSSC-individuals which would serve as
the output of the operation.
(15) J-en/-ynK := λQλx.Qcluster[x≤ Q∧ x ∈MSSC]
As noted in section 2, collective nouns in Welsh may also allow the application
of the plural following the singulative, as was given in (4). The definitions of the
singulative and plural here allow for this possibility: the application of the singulative
provides the MSSC individuals which in turn feed the application of the plural.
5 Conclusion
Taking a broader range of number systems, of which Welsh is just one instance, into
account indicates that the semantic distinctions available in the classical mereologi-
cal treatment of countability are not sufficient for a full treatment of countability.
Enriching mereology with topological connectedness relations not only provides the
expressivity to treat Welsh’s collective/unit class, but resolves long-standing prob-
lems for the classical account, namely the “minimal parts” problem and difficulties
with predicates such as fence. Future work should explore how the analysis given
here may be extended both in terms of other grammatical systems as well as in terms
of other regions of the lexicon, e.g., for eventive and abstract nouns.
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